Philosophy of Science 61 (2):206-227 (1994)
|Abstract||I adopt a cladistic view of species, and explore the possibility that there exists an equally valuable cladistic view of organismic traits. This suggestion seems to run counter to the stress on functional views of biological traits in recent work in philosophy and psychology. I show how the tension between these two views can be defused with a multilevel view of biological explanation. Despite the attractions of this compromise, I conclude that we must reject it, and adopt an essentially cladistic conception of biological traits|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Deborah J. Brown (2011). Cartesian Functional Analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):75 - 92.
Arno Wouters (2005). The Functional Perspective of Organismal Biology. In Thomas Reydon & Lia Hemerik (eds.), Current Themes in Theoretical Biology. Springer.
Olivier Rieppel (2005). Monophyly, Paraphyly, and Natural Kinds. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):465-487.
Nico M. Franz (2005). Outline of an Explanatory Account of Cladistic Practice. Biology and Philosophy 20 (2-3):489-515.
Mark Wilkinson (1990). A Commentary on Ridley's Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):433-446.
Arno Wouters (1995). Viability Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):435-457.
Thomas Reydon (2009). How to Fix Kind Membership: A Problem for Hpc Theory and a Solution. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).
Robin O. Andreasen (2004). The Cladistic Race Concept: A Defense. Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):425-442.
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #122,951 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?