Does free will remain a mystery? A response to Van Inwagen

Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269 (2005)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it
Keywords Agent  Causation  Chance  Free Will  Metaphysics  Van Inwagen, Peter
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    Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
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