Emotions as natural and normative kinds

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):901-911 (2004)
Abstract
In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not `natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by `natural kind', suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories.
Keywords Emotion  Human  Natural Kinds  Normative  Science
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Mitchell Green (2010). Perceiving Emotions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2013). Three Kinds of Social Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):n/a-n/a.

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