Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28 (2007)
In this paper, I argue that trying is the locus of freedom and moral responsibility. Thus, any plausible view of free and responsible action must accommodate and account for free tryings. I then consider a version of agent causation whereby the agent directly causes her tryings. On this view, the agent is afforded direct control over her efforts and there is no need to posit—as other agent-causal theorists do—an uncaused event. I discuss the potential advantages of this sort of view, and its challenges.
|Keywords||freedom trying exertion action agent causation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Robert Kane (1999). Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.
Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2008). Bad Luck Once Again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.
Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchill (2004). Reasons Explanation and Agent Control: In Search of an Integrated Account. Philosophical Topics 32 (1):241.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press 101--21.
Meghan E. Griffith (2005). Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.
Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP
Frank Hindriks (2008). The Freedom of Collective Agents. Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads103 ( #37,099 of 1,793,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #65,113 of 1,793,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?