Online research in philosophy

The Cold War has ended and the post-Cold War world is often presented as one in which democracy and market economies are victorious. Francis Fukuyama goes so far as to claim that democratic politics has triumphed on a global scale.[ii] At least from a statistical point of view, most nations now declare themselves to be democracies, and a majority of the global population lives in these countries.[iii] However, the claim that the West won the Cold War too easily occludes recognition that the victory of democracy is restricted to the political sphere. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union has made the world “safe for democracy” in the political sphere, it has also made the world “safe for capitalism” in the economic sphere. In other words, the victory of democracy is partial since market economies remain largely undemocratic.

Two distinct problems of objectivity in moral theory are that of reference and truth and that of justification. These questions are often run together. However, it is possible to discuss the two questions separately. A defense is offered of moral ascriptions and moral properties, in opposition to the proposals of Mackie and Harman. But the thin or minimal defense of moral ascriptions leaves the second problem of objectivity unaddressed. Further argumentation leads to a proposal that claims limited moral objectivity.

This is a short essay written for the forthcoming *Handbook of American Pragmatism* (Cheryl Misak, ed., Oxford University Press). The author argues that the standard narrative, according to which pragmatism went into eclipse in the years of the Cold War is nonviable.

This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since political forces cannot explain why a philosophy of science with liberal democratic, anti-communist aims did not flourish. The paper then argues that if professionalization is understood in the right way, it might point toward an explanation of the apolitical stance of Cold War philosophy of science.

This intriguing and ground-breaking book is the first in-depth study of the development of philosophy of science in the United States during the Cold War. It documents the political vitality of logical empiricism and Otto Neurath's Unity of Science Movement when these projects emigrated to the US in the 1930s and follows their de-politicization by a convergence of intellectual, cultural and political forces in the 1950s. Students of logical empiricism and the Vienna Circle treat these as strictly intellectual non-political projects. In fact, the refugee philosophers of science were highly active politically and debated questions about values inside and outside science, as a result of which their philosophy of science was scrutinized politically both from within and without the profession, by such institutions as J. Edgar Hoover's FBI. It will prove absorbing reading to philosophers and historians of science, intellectual historians, and scholars of Cold War studies.

Sandra Harding is working on the reconstruction of scientific objectivity. Lorraine Daston argues that objectivity is a concept that has historically evolved. Her account of the development of "aperspectival objectivity" provides an opportunity to see Harding's "strong objectivity" project as a stage in this evolution, to locate it in the history of migration of ideals from moral philosophy to natural science, and to support Harding's desire to retain something of the ontological significance of objectivity.

U. S. cold-war interests have had a significant impact on historical writings concerning the roles of various groups during the World War II destruction of European Jewry. These writings focus, for example, on the Catholic Church's actions in saving children, rather than on the antisemitic pronouncements of Church leaders and their indifference to the killing of Jews during and immediately after the war. Holocaust historiography understates the aid given to Jews by the Soviet Union. It also minimizes the continuation of antisemitic acts on the part of Polish organizations, including the Home Army. Finally, the mythology surrounding Raoul Wallenberg dovetails nicely with cold-war politics and the desire of sections of the ultraorthodox Jewish community to forget their own disastrous actions.

The past thirty years have been marked by an energetic renewal of traditional just war theory. Now changes in relations among nations and changes in military technology may require a recasting of the just war ethic comparable to its recasting by Vitoria and Suarez in the six-teenth century. After reviewing the way the just war tradition met the practical tests posed by Vietnam, nuclear deterrence, and the Gulf War, I will argue that the erosion of the Westphalia legacy and the collapse of the cold war press two questions upon us: Can any modern war be defended as just? Are there resources in the just war tradition for assessing what constitutes morally defensible, even morally required, intervention by one state in the affairs of another?