Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment

Philosophical Studies 47 (2):213 - 247 (1985)
Abstract
The paper describes the evolution of russell's theory of judgment between 1910 and 1913, With especial reference to his recently published "theory of knowledge" (1913). Russell abandoned the book and with it the theory of judgment as a result of wittgenstein's criticisms. These criticisms are examined in detail and found to constitute a refutation of russell's theory. Underlying differences between wittgenstein's and russell's views on logic are broached more sketchily
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    References found in this work BETA
    D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
    A. J. Ayer (1971). Russell and Moore. Cambridge,Harvard University Press.
    Peter Geach (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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