David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Reduction and the Special Sciences (Tilburg, April 10-12, 2008) (2008)
This paper is an analysis of scientific types – the categories of a scientific taxonomy. I argue that the philosophical view about mental types stands in contrast to the real nature of scientific types, which is in turn responsible for the mind-body problem. Since the view on the relation between psychology and neurology was broadened to the status about special sciences in general, my argument can also be applied to the general special science discussion. My picture of types being the result of categorizing tokens with respect to their micro structure is used to show how scientific practice makes multiple realizability implausible.
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