David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 74 (1):60-78 (2008)
"Though this be madness, yet there is method in't." Hamlet , act II, scene ii Abstract: Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively different from rationality constraints both in their justification and their recipients. Third, it rejects additional conditions on propositional attitudes, which purport to necessitate a normative commitment. Thus, inherent normativity is rejected; and with it the claim that intentional action explanations differ substantially from other explanations because they are inherently normative.
|Keywords||social sciences rationality action explanation norms of reasoning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1985). Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
Donald Davidson (1987). Problems in the Explanation of Action. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality. Blackwell
David Henderson (2002). Norms, Normative Principles, and Explanation: On Not Getting is From Ought. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
Citations of this work BETA
D. Wade Hands (2014). Normative Ecological Rationality: Normative Rationality in the Fast-and-Frugal-Heuristics Research Program. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):396-410.
Similar books and articles
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Peter Glück & Michael Schmid (1977). II. The Rationality Principle and Action Explanations: Koertge's Reconstruction of Popper's Logic of Action Explanations. Inquiry 20 (1-4):72-81.
Joshua Gert (2004). Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Gl (1977). Ii. The Rationality Principle and Action Explanations: Koertge's Reconstruction of Popper's Logic of Action Explanations. Inquiry 20 (1-4):72 – 81.
Thomas Kelly (2002). The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.
Nick Zangwill (2005). The Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Alan Millar (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #94,044 of 1,700,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #62,577 of 1,700,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?