Brain Imaging and Psychiatric Classification
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4) (2012)
| Abstract | Fielding and Marwede attempt to lay down directions for an applied onto-psychiatry. According to their proposal, such an enterprise requires us to accept certain metaphysical and methodological claims about how brain and experience are related. To put it in one sentence, our critique is that we find their metaphysics questionable and their methodology clinically impracticable.A first fundamental problem for their project, as it is expressed in their paper, is that their overall aim is unclear. At least three different aims might be read as motivating their efforts, here listed according to their strength:They aim to develop tools for the development of knowledge representational systems that can be used by .. | |||||||||
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Lara Huber (2008). Imaging the Brain: Visualising “Pathological Entities”? Searching for Reliable Protocols Within Psychiatry and Their Impact on the Understanding of Psychiatric Diseases. Poiesis and Praxis 6 (1-2):27-41.
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