David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):465 - 490 (2011)
In "Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content", Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to "Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction", Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper I argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Béatrice Longuenesse (1998). Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the "Critique of Pure Reason". Princeton University Press.
Jeff Speaks (2005). Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.
Robert Hanna (2001). Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (forthcoming). A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
Colin McLear (2014). The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
Thomas Land (2015). Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction. Kantian Review 20 (1):25-51.
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