Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action

Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167 (2011)
Abstract
I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.
Keywords knowledge of action  perception  practical reasoning  visual attention  non-inferential justification
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References found in this work BETA
Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
T. Burge (1998). Reason and the First Person U Knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. And Macdonald, C. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.

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