Critical Realism, Post-Positivism, and the Possibility of Knowledge

Routledge (2004)
Abstract At the heart of contemporary relativism, is the idea that the world has no mind-independent characteristics. As there is no way that the world is on its own, any opinions held may be regarded as valid. Critical realism is a promising alternative to such a position. Critical realism allows for the conclusion that certain processes lead to specific outcomes regardless of how we think about them, which in turn places a limited but crucial check on relativism. Groff defends "realism about causality" through close discussions of Kant, Hilary Putnam, Brain Ellis and Charles Taylor, among others. In so doing she affirms critical realism, but with several important qualifications. In particular, she rejects the theory of truth advanced by Roy Bhaskar. She also attempts to both clarify and correct earlier critical realist attempts to apply realism about causality to the social sciences. By connecting issues in metaphysics and philosophy of science to the problem of relativism, Groff bridges the gap betweenthe philosophical literature and broader debates surrounding socio-political theory and poststructuralist thought. This unique approach will make the book of interest to philosophers and socio-political theorists alike.
Keywords Relativity  Causation  Critical realism  Knowledge, Theory of  Truth  Positivism
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Call number BD221.G76 2004
ISBN(s) 041533473X   9780415334730
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