Sensory intuition and the dogma of localization

Inquiry 5 (1-4):238 – 251 (1962)
Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism. 1 At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time. 2 In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis.
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Gustav Bergmann (1947). Russell on Particulars. Philosophical Review 56 (1):59-72.
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