David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Linguistic Review 22:249-270 (2005)
Jackendoff defends a mentalist approach to semantics that investigates conceptual structures in the mind/brain and their interfaces with other structures, including specifically linguistic structures responsible for syntactic and phonological competence. He contrasts this approach with one that seeks to characterize the intentional relations between expressions and objects in the world. The latter, he argues, cannot be reconciled with mentalism. He objects in particular that intentionality cannot be naturalized and that the relevant notion of object is suspect. I critically discuss these objections, arguing in part that Jackendoff’s position rests on questionable philosophical assumptions.
|Keywords||internalism externalism ontology intentionality philosophy of linguistics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ray S. Jackendoff (1983). Semantics And Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fred Adams (2003). Semantic Paralysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):666-667.
Ray S. Jackendoff (1985). Information is in the Mind of the Beholder. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (February):23-33.
Ray S. Jackendoff (1990). Semantic Structures. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ross W. Gayler (2006). Vector Symbolic Architectures Are a Viable Alternative for Jackendoff's Challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (1):78-79.
James Higginbotham (2003). Jackendoff's Conceptualism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):680-681.
Steven Gross (2007). Reply to Jackendoff. The Linguistic Review 24 (4):423-429.
Added to index2009-01-30
Total downloads59 ( #68,852 of 1,790,151 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #199,515 of 1,790,151 )
How can I increase my downloads?