Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):285-307 (1995)
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Abstract

We compare Carnap's and Kuhn's views on science. Although there are important differences between them, the similarities are striking. The basis for the latter is a pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science, which suggests that the view that post-positivist philosophy of science constitutes a radical revolution which has no interesting affinities with logical positivism must be seriously mistaken.

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