Does Freudian theory resolve "the paradoxes of irrationality"?

In this paper, I criticize the claim made by Donald Davidson, among others, that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides “a conceptual framework within which to describe and understand irrationality.” Further, I defend my epistemological strictures on the explanatory and therapeutic foundations of the psychoanalytic enterprise against the efforts of Davidson, Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al., to undermine them
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00044.x
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Alfred R. Mele (1997). Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.

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