Evans on identification-freedom

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):605-617 (2007)
Gareth Evans’ account of Identifi cation-freedom (IF), which he devel- ops in Chapters 6 and 7 of The Varieties of Reference (henceforth VR) is almost universally misunderstood.1 Howell is guilty of this same mis- understanding, and as a result claims to have mounted a criticism of Evans, when in fact he has not. I will take the occasion of Howell’s oth- erwise insightful article to clarify Evans’ position. Note that the bulk of Howell’s analysis is targeted at the phenomenon known as immunity to error through misidentifi cation (IEM), which is related to but not (necessarily) identical to IF. Therefore, the accuracy of Howell’s treat- ment of Evans in particular is tangential to the main thrust of his article. My exegesis of Evans’ account — like any non-trivial exegesis — goes somewhat beyond anything Evans overtly says. That Evans did not ex- plicitly put the pieces together in the way I suggest they fi t no doubt contributes to the widespread misunderstanding of his views. But I am.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2008.0003
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Maura Tumulty (2011). Modeling Expressing on Demonstrating. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:43-76.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

216 ( #7,761 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

191 ( #3,230 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.