David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76 (2009)
It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist approach to defeaters that is able to overcome the main shortcomings of the other approaches.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mikael Janvid (2008). Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification. Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.
Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Modality. Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607 - 617.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607-617.
Jan Willem Wieland (2008). What Problem of Universals? Philosophica 81 (81):7-21.
Justin P. McBrayer (2007). Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):289-302.
Peter Baumann (2009). Reliabilism—Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):77-89.
Added to index2010-01-16
Total downloads67 ( #27,829 of 1,692,449 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #16,930 of 1,692,449 )
How can I increase my downloads?