David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509 (2010)
In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if they are reliable. If this is true, Weinberg's new challenge comes down to the claim that philosophical intuitions are not reliable since they are significantly unstable. In the second part of my paper I will argue that and why the experimentally established instability of folk intuitions about philosophical cases does not show that philosopher's expert intuitions about these cases are instable
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Laurence BonJour (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
Regina A. Rini (2015). How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2015). Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection. Cognition 141:127-137.
Hamid Seyedsayamdost (2015). On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication. Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):378-410.
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