Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):5-23 (1997)
|Abstract||b>: In this article I outline, apply, and defend a theory of natural representation. The main consequences of this theory are: i) representational status is a matter of how physical entities are used, and specifically is not a matter of causation, nomic relations with the intentional object, or information; ii) there are genuine (brain-)internal representations; iii) such representations are really representations, and not just farcical pseudo-representations, such as attractors, principal components, state-space partitions, or what-have-you;and iv) the theory allows us to sharply distinguish those complex behaviors which are genuinely cognitive from those which are merely complex and adaptive|
|Keywords||Causation Natural Physical Representation Science|
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