David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261 (2008)
This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,” I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background, I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place
|Keywords||Bodily awareness Intentional action Epistemology of action Sense of agency and ownership|
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References found in this work BETA
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Shaun Gallagher (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
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Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
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