Not All Attitudes are Propositional

European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391 (2012)
Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. I reach this conclusion by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes in terms of the propositional fail, but that some non-propositional attitudes don’t even supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete and those who hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken
Keywords intentionality  propositional attitudes  non-propositional attitudes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00534.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,661
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jane Friedman (2013). Question‐Directed Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
Alex Grzankowski (2013). Non‐Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
Jonathan Webber (2013). Character, Attitude and Disposition. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):n/a-n/a.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
Jerry A. Fodor (1978). Propositional Attitudes. The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
Nick Zangwill (2005). The Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Richard H. Feldman (1986). Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

124 ( #21,175 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

27 ( #35,404 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.