The logic of normative falsification: rationality and experiments in decision theory

Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1):59-93 (2000)
The paper investigates how normative considerations influenced the development of the theory of individual decision-making under risk. In the first part, the debate between Maurice Allais and the 'Neo-Bernoullians' (supporting the Expected Utility model) is reconstructed, in order to show that a controversy on the definition of rational decision and on the methodology of normative justification played a crucial role in legitimizing the Allais-paradox as genuinely refuting evidence. In the second part, it is shown how informal notions of rationality were among the tacit heuristic principles that led to the discovery of generalized models of decision put forward in the early eighties to replace the received model.
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DOI 10.1080/135017800362248
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Imre Lakatos (1976). A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):201-223.

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