David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1):59-93 (2000)
The paper investigates how normative considerations influenced the development of the theory of individual decision-making under risk. In the first part, the debate between Maurice Allais and the 'Neo-Bernoullians' (supporting the Expected Utility model) is reconstructed, in order to show that a controversy on the definition of rational decision and on the methodology of normative justification played a crucial role in legitimizing the Allais-paradox as genuinely refuting evidence. In the second part, it is shown how informal notions of rationality were among the tacit heuristic principles that led to the discovery of generalized models of decision put forward in the early eighties to replace the received model.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
F. P. Ramsey (2010). Truth and Probability. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 52-94.
Imre Lakatos (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press 91-195.
John Harsanyi (1977). Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Social Research 44.
Imre Lakatos (1976). A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):201-223.
Citations of this work BETA
Till Grüne-Yanoff, Caterina Marchionni & Ivan Moscati (2014). Introduction: Methodologies of Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):325-342.
Michiru Nagatsu (2013). Experimental Philosophy of Economics. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.
D. Wade Hands (2014). Normative Ecological Rationality: Normative Rationality in the Fast-and-Frugal-Heuristics Research Program. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):396-410.
Similar books and articles
Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Decision Theory. In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hajek (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press
Marcel Boumans (2008). Battle in the Planning Office: Field Experts Versus Normative Statisticians. Social Epistemology 22 (4):389 – 404.
Mark Colyvan (2013). Idealisations in Normative Models. Synthese 190 (8):1337-1350.
Paul Weirich (2004). Realistic Decision Theory: Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances. OUP Usa.
Reed Richter (1984). Rationality Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Pitfalls for Realistic Decision Theory: An Illustration From Sequential Choice. Synthese 176 (1):23 - 40.
John C. Harsanyi (1977). Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory. Erkenntnis 11 (1):25 - 53.
Mark Colyvan (2009). Naturalising Normativity. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press
Nathalie Etchart (2002). Adequate Moods for Non-Eu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework. Theory and Decision 52 (1):1-28.
Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2014). Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.
Richard Watt, Francisco J. Vázquez & Ignacio Moreno (2001). An Experiment on Rational Insurance Decisions. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):247-296.
David R. Mandel (2000). On the Meaning and Function of Normative Analysis: Conceptual Blur in the Rationality Debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):686-687.
Pradier Pierre-Charles, David Teira & Jallais Sophie (2008). Facts, Norms and Expected Utility Functions. History of the Human Sciences 21 (2):45-62.
Added to index2012-02-20
Total downloads11 ( #382,411 of 1,932,462 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #332,988 of 1,932,462 )
How can I increase my downloads?