Tensor products and split-level architecture: Foundational issues in the classicism-connectionism debate
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S239-S247 (1996)
This paper responds to criticisms levelled by Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin against connectionism. Specifically, I will rebut the charge that connectionists cannot account for representational systematicity without implementing a classical architecture. This will be accomplished by drawing on Paul Smolensky's Tensor Product model of representation and on his insights about split-level architectures
|Keywords||Aesthetics Architecture Classicism Model Science Fodor, J Mclaughlin, B Pylyshyn, Z|
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