David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97 (2007)
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
|Keywords||Moral ignorance Blameless ignorance Culpability Blameworthiness Caution Recklessness Responsibility Contextualism Abortion Vegetarianism|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Brad Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Tomasz Żuradzki (2014). Moral Uncertainty in Bioethical Argumentation: A New Understanding of the Pro-Life View on Early Human Embryos. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (6):441-457.
Stephen Kearns (2013). Free Will Agnosticism. Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Jan Willem Wieland (2015). What's Special About Moral Ignorance? Ratio 29 (1):n/a-n/a.
Elizabeth Harman (2011). Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Ratio 24 (4):443-468.
Dana Sarah Howard (2015). "Transforming Others: On the Limits of "You "Ll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning. Res Philosophica 92 (2):341-370.
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