David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 164 (1):45-60 (2008)
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be.
|Keywords||Deriving “ought” from “is” Formal counterexamples Hume Pigden Schurz|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
W. K. Frankena (1939). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind 48 (192):464-477.
Charles Pigden (2010). On the Triviality of Hume's Law: A Reply to Gerhard Schurz. In Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan 217-238.
Barry Stroud (1977). Hume. Routledge.
A. N. Prior (1960). The Autonomy of Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Adam Thompson (1986). Counterexamples to Nozick's Account of Transmission of Knowledge Via Proof. Philosophy Research Archives 12:261-265.
Markus Schrenk (2010). Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta: From Reductionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions. In G. Damschen, K. Stueber & R. Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2000). From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology. Argumentation 14 (2):159-174.
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Daniel Stoljar (2007). Distinctions in Distinction. In Jesper Kallestrup & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences. Oxford University Press
Markus Schrenk (2010). Antidotes for Dispositional Essentialism. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). From Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge
Neil Sinhababu (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended. Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #53,075 of 1,906,940 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #277,703 of 1,906,940 )
How can I increase my downloads?