Merely possible explanation

Religious Studies 47 (3):359-370 (2011)
Abstract
Graham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cosmological argument that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss as well as Pruss individually have granted Oppy’s inference from possible explanation to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the strong principle of sufficient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy’s objection to the new cosmological argument by arguing that it is logically possible that some truths are merely possibly explained.
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Alexander Pruss & Richard M. Gale (2003). A Response to Almeida and Judisch. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):65-72.
William Lane Craig (2011). Graham Oppy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument. International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):303-330.
Richard Swinburne (1990). The Limits of Explanation. Philosophy 27 (Supplement):177 - 193.
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