Themistius on Evil

Phronesis 46 (2):189-208 (2001)
Abstract
Although Themistius does not develop a theodicy, his observations on evil are fairly consistent. Both in his paraphrases of Aristotle and in his speeches, he argues that since God is the intelligent and powerful cause of all good things in the universe, evil is due to the στέρησις in matter and to the ἄνοιι of human beings. Despite some (Neo-)Platonic and Stoic influences, Themistius defends a basically Peripatetic world-view, in which evil is minimized
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Guy Guldentops (2001). Themistius on Evil. Phronesis 46 (2):189 - 208.
    Lorelle Lamascus (2006). Aquinas and Themistius on Intellect. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:255-273.
    Myrna Gabbe (2010). Themistius on Concept Acquisition and Knowledge of Essences. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (3):215-235.
    Michael Gelven (1998). This Side of Evil. Marquette University Press.
    James R. Beebe, Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    John F. Crosby (2001). Is All Evil Really Only Privation? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:197-209.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-08-31

    Total downloads

    4 ( #198,532 of 1,088,388 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,388 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.