Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia

Synthese 171 (3):387 - 397 (2009)
Abstract
We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
Keywords Epistemology  Scepticism  Closure  Transmission  Disjunctivism  Contextualism  Knowledge  Evidence
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
David Lewis (1996). ``Elusive Knowledge&Quot. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:549-567.
John McDowell (1982). Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy 68:455-79.

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