David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 153 (3):435 - 441 (2011)
Response-dependence theses are usually formulated in terms of a priori true biconditionals of roughly the form ‘something, x, falls under the concept ‘F’ ↔ x would elicit response R from subjects S under conditions C’. Such formulations are vulnerable to conditional fallacy problems; counterexamples threaten whenever the C-conditions’ coming to obtain might alter the object with respect to F. Crispin Wright has suggested that such problems can be avoided by placing the C-conditions in a proviso. This ensures that any changes triggered by the C-conditions’ coming to obtain will be irrelevant to the truth of the biconditional. I argue that this move leaves the equations vulnerable to counterexamples of a slightly different kind: Cases where the change is triggered, not by the C-conditions’ coming to obtain, but by the response. I consider two ways to resist these counterexamples, and argue that both are insufficient. The upshot is a challenge that must be met if provisoed biconditionals are to serve their purpose.
|Keywords||Response-dependence Conditional fallacy Finkish dispositions Provisoed biconditionals|
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Sungho Choi (2008). Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 117 (468):795-841.
Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti (2014). Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
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