Deflationism, the problem of representation, and Horwich's use theory of meaning

This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich’s use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental tomeaning.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00313.x
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