Intuitionistic logic with strong negation

Studia Logica 36 (1-2):49 - 59 (1977)
This paper is a reaction to the following remark by grzegorczyk: "the compound sentences are not a product of experiment. they arise from reasoning. this concerns also negations; we see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue." generally, in science the truth is ascertained as indirectly as falsehood. an example: a litmus-paper is used to verify the sentence "the solution is acid." this approach gives rise to a (very intuitionistic indeed) conservative extension of the heyting logic satisfying natural duality laws
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Heinrich Wansing (2002). Diamonds Are a Philosopher's Best Friends. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
Lloyd Humberstone (2013). Replacement in Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):49-89.
Lloyd Humberstone (2000). Contra-Classical Logics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):438 – 474.

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