On rawls’s distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2):300-305 (2004)
Abstract
s distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice relies on the notion of a procedure that is guaranteed to lead to a certain independently specifiable result. Clarification of this notion shows that it makes the distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice unreal, in the following sense: whether, in a particular case, we have an instance of perfect or imperfect procedural justice depends only on how we choose to specify the procedure that is being followed. Key Words: procedural justice • John Rawls.
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