Why Deliberative Democracy is Different

Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (01):161- (2000)
In modern pluralist societies, political disagreement often reflects moral disagreement, as citizens with conflicting perspectives on fundamental values debate the laws that govern their public life. Any satisfactory theory of democracy must provide a way of dealing with this moral disagreement. A fundamental problem confronting all democratic theorists is to find a morally justifiable way of making binding collective decisions in the face of continuing moral conflict.
Keywords Pluralism  Democracy  Moral conflict
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DOI 10.1017/S0265052500002570
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