What Swinburne should have concluded
Religious Studies 33 (3):243-247 (1997)
| Abstract | In "The Existence of God," Richard Swinburne presents a detailed examination of the various arguments for and against God's existence. Methodologically, Swinburne's approach is to develop a cumulative case argument wherein the various theistic arguments constitute the accumulated evidences. Additionally, Swinburne attempts to utilise the formal probability calculus (Bayes's Theorem) to quantify the probability of God's existence in light of the various evidences. However, many have been disappointed with the anticlimactic nature of Swinburne's conclusion. This essay suggest that a much more positive conclusion follows directly from Swinburne's arguments | |||||||||
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David Mcnaughton (2002). Is God (Almost) a Consequentialist? Swinburne's Moral Theory. Religious Studies 38 (3):265-281.
Quentin Smith (1998). Swinburne's Explanation of the Universe. Religious Studies 34 (1):91-102.
Agnieszka Rostalska & Rafal Urbaniak (2009). Swinburne's Modal Argument for the Existence of a Soul. Philo 12 (1):73-87.
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Victor Cosculluela (1997). Death and God: The Case of Richard Swinburne. Religious Studies 33 (3):293-302.
Richard Swinburne (2004). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Gwiazda (2010). Richard Swinburne, the Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values. Philosophia 38 (2):357-363.
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