David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kantian Review 7 (1):1-37 (2003)
Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against skepticism – that the objects of common sense exist, let alone that they have philosophical dominance, or, in contrast, on explaining that it is only the theoretical discoveries of science that determine what is objective, one can rather work primarily to determine a positive and balanced philosophical relation between the distinct frameworks of our manifest and scientific images
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References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (1996). Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Immanuel Kant (2007/1991). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 449-451.
Karl Ameriks (1981). Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1):53-79.
Rae Langton (1998). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press.
John Rawls (2000). Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian A. Chance (2012). Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):311-331.
Martin Sticker (2015). The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent – A Reply to Ido Geiger. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):976-989.
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