Naturalism, normativity, and explanation: The scientistic biases of contemporary naturalism

Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274 (1993)
Abstract
The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and the subjectivity of values are better seen as stemming from scientistic ideals of knowledge than from dictates of naturalism. Scientists qua scientists make value judgments, and setting aside scientistic assumptions and unrealizable conceptions of scientific objectivity should lead us to more symmetrical metaphilosophical conception of epistemic and ethical normativity than that which underlies Harman's account.
Keywords Naturalism  normativity  explanation  Gilbert Harman  Hilary Putnam
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    J. Dewey (1939). T Heory of Valuation. In J. A. Boydston (ed.), The Later Works, 1925--1953. Southern Illinois University Press.

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