Richard Swinburne, the existence of God, and exact numerical values

Philosophia 38 (2):357-363 (2010)
Abstract
Richard Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God discusses many probabilities, ultimately concluding that God probably exists. Swinburne gives exact values to almost none of these probabilities. I attempted to assign values to the probabilities that met that weak condition that they could be correct. In this paper, I first present a brief outline of Swinburne’s argument in The Existence of God. I then present the problems I encountered in Swinburne’s argument, specifically problems that interfered with my attempt to arrive at values for the probabilities discussed by Swinburne. Finally, I suggest that Swinburne’s argument would be more persuasive if he assigned exact values to his probabilities.
Keywords Swinburne  The existence of God  Bayes’s Theorem
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References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
A. Grunbaum (2000). A New Critique of Theological Interpretations of Physical Cosmology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):1-43.

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