David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876 (2008)
In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that the delusional belief constitutes an attempt on the part of the patient to explain his/her initially odd and somewhat disturbed phenomenal content and, moreover, that the delusion then structures the patient’s experience such that what he/she perceives is an impostor. This fact is used to explain the delusional belief’s maintenance and resistance to revision. Thus, whilst accepting that second-stage cognitive disruption has a part to play in explaining the Capgras delusion, the emphasis here is placed on the role played by the patient’s changing phenomenal content and its congruence with the delusional belief. Unlike traditional two-stage models, which posit a unidirectional progression from experience to belief, the interactionist model advocates a two-way interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes. The application of this model to other delusional beliefs is also considered
|Keywords||info:mesh/Recognition (Psychology) info:mesh/Cognition Disorders info:mesh/Humans info:mesh/Capgras Syndrome info:mesh/Delusions info:mesh/Face info:mesh/Interpersonal Relations Face Humans Delusions Interpersonal Relations Recognition (Psychology) Cognition Disorders Capgras Syndrome Culture info:mesh/Culture|
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Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti, Rochelle Cox & Amanda Barnier (2011). Can We Recreate Delusions in the Laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):109 - 131.
Garry Young (2009). In What Sense 'Familiar'? Examining Experiential Differences Within Pathologies of Facial Recognition. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
Garry Young (2011). Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
Neralie Wise (forthcoming). The Capgras Delusion: An Integrated Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
Jennifer Radden (2012). Vorhersagefehler und Gehirnverletzungen. Zwei-Faktoren-Theorien über Wahnvorstellungen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):903-918.
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