On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153 (1997)
Abstract
We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X97270056
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