Concepts are beliefs about essences
In R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Albert Newen & Ulrich Nortmann (eds.), Proceedings of an International Symposium. Stanford, CSLI Publications (2001)
| Abstract | Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) have made a convincing case that neither mea- nings nor beliefs are in the head. Most philosophers, it seems, have accepted their argument. Putnam explained that a subject | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRom Harré (2005). Chemical Kinds and Essences Revisited. Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1):7-30.
Fei Xu, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Cristina M. Sorrentino (1998). Concepts Are Not Beliefs, but Having Concepts is Having Beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-89.
Gilbert Harman (1982). Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Brian Loar, "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:654 - 661.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Putnam's Traditional Neo-Essentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):151-170.
Jonathan Sutton (2005). Stick to What You Know. Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
Jeeloo Liu (2002). Physical Externalism and Social Externalism: Are They Really Compatible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:381-404.
Tim Crane (1991). All the Difference in the World. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.
Bryan G. Norton (1980). De Re Modality, Generic Essences, and Science. Philosophia 9 (2):167-186.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads25 ( #49,656 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,251 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
