In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):797-811 (2013)
Abstract
I defend a hard-line reply to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom accuses compatibilists who take a hard-line reply to his manipulation argument of adopting inappropriate initial attitudes towards the cases central to his argument. If Pereboom is correct he has shown that a hard-line response is inadequate. Fortunately for the compatibilist, Pereboom’s list of appropriate initial attitudes is incomplete and at least one of the initial attitudes he leaves out provides room for a revised hard-line reply to be successfully mounted against the multiple-case argument
Keywords Free will  Moral responsibility  Four-case argument  Manipulation  Compatibilism  Source incompatibilism
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Haas (2013). Merit, Fit, and Basic Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.
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