Davidson on first-person authority

Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):285-304 (1997)
Abstract
Davidson’s explanation of first‐person authority in utterance of sentences of the form ‘I V that p’ derives first‐person authority from the requirements of interpretation of speech. His account is committed to the view that utterance sentences are truth‐bearers, that believing that p is a matter of holding true an utterance sentence, and that a speaker’s knowledge of what he means gives him knowledge of what belief he expresses by his utterance. These claims are here faulted. His explanation of first‐person authority by reference to the requirements of interpretability is committed to the view that all understanding involves interpretation. This is argued to be a misconception of understanding and of speaker’s meaning. Davidson’s account involves acceptance of the cognitive assumption that normally when a person Vs that p, he knows that he does. This assumption is challenged. Throughout, Davidson’s conception is compared and contrasted with Wittgenstein’s
Keywords Authority  Belief  Epistemology  Intentionality  Knowledge  Davidson, D
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References found in this work BETA
John Austin (1961). Compiled by JO Urmson and GJ Warnock. In J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers. Clarendon Press.

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Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
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