David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 20 (1):25 - 47 (1969)
Carnap's early system of inductive logic make degrees of confirmation depend on the languages in which they are expressed. They are sensitive to which predicates are, in the language, taken as primitive. Hence they fail to be ‘linguistically invariant’. His later systems, in which prior probabilities are assigned to elements of a model rather than sentences of a language, are sensitive to which properties in the model are called primitive. Critics have often protested against these features of his work. This paper shows how to make his systems independent of any choice of primitive predicates or primitive properties.The solution is related to another criticism of inductive logic. It has been noticed that Carnap's systems are too all-embracing. Hisc(h, e) is defined for all sentencesh ande. Yet for manyh ande, the evidencee does not warrant any assessment of the probability ofh. We need an inductive logic in whichc(h, e) is defined only whene really does bear onh. This paper sketches the measure theory of such a logic, and, within this measure theory, provides ‘relativized’ versions of Carnap's systems which are linguistically invariant
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1963). My Basic Conceptions of Probability and Induction, PA Schilpp Ed. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,Open Court.
Wesley C. Salmon (1967). Carnap's Inductive Logic. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):725-739.
Citations of this work BETA
Joachim Hornung (1980). Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.
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