David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 1 (3):279-320 (1991)
A process-oriented model of belief is presented which permits the representation of nested propositional attitudes within first-order logic. The model (NIM, for nested intensional model) is axiomatized, sense-based (via intensions), and sanctions inferences involving nested epistemic attitudes, with different agents and different times. Because NIM is grounded upon senses, it provides a framework in which agents may reason about the beliefs of another agent while remaining neutral with respect to the syntactic forms used to express the latter agent's beliefs. Moreover, NIM provides agents with a conceptual map, interrelating the concepts of knowledge, belief, truth, and a number of cognate concepts, such as infers, retracts, and questions. The broad scope of NIM arises in part from the fact that its axioms are represented in a novel extension of first-order logic, -FOL (presented herein). -FOL simultaneously permits the representation of truth ascriptions, implicit self-reference, and arbitrarily embedded sentences within a first-order setting. Through the combined use of principles derived from Frege, Montague, and Kripke, together with context-sensitive semantic conventions, -FOL captures the logic of truth inferences, while avoiding the inconsistencies exhibited by Tarski. Applications of -FOL and NIM to interagent reasoning are described and the soundness and completeness of -FOL are established herein.
|Keywords||Process belief model nested propositional attitudes senses truth liar paradox|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John A. Barnden (1986). Imputations and Explications: Representational Problems in Treatments of Prepositional Attitudes. Cognitive Science 10 (3):319-364.
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Tyler Burge (1984). Epistemic Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):5-29.
Alonzo Church (1954). Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief. Philosophical Studies 5 (5):65 - 73.
M. J. Cresswell (1985). Structured Meanings. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orilia (1994). Belief Representation in a Deductivist Type-Free Doxastic Logic. Minds and Machines 4 (2):163-203.
Similar books and articles
John Cantwell (2006). A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422.
John Cantwell (2005). A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (4):397-422.
Igor Douven & Alexander Riegler (2009). Extending the Hegselmann–Krause Model III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States. Episteme 6 (2):145-163.
Brian Hill (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part I: The General Framework. Studia Logica 89 (1):81 - 109.
Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191-209.
Christopher Menzel (2011). Knowledge Representation, the World Wide Web, and the Evolution of Logic. Synthese 182 (2):269-295.
Stuart C. Shapiro & William J. Rapaport (1991). Models and Minds. In Robert E. Cummins & John L. Pollock (eds.), Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press. 215--259.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #267,324 of 1,096,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #218,857 of 1,096,180 )
How can I increase my downloads?