|Abstract||Bohr’s atomic model is one of the better known examples of empirically successful, albeit inconsistent, theoretical schemes in the history of physics. For this reason, many philosophers use this model to illustrate their position for the occurrence and the function of inconsistency in science. In this paper, I proceed to a critical comparison of the structure and the aims of Bohr’s research program – the starting point of which was the formulation of his model – with some of its contemporary philosophical readings. My study comes to conclude that the attempt of certain philosophers to accommodate Bohr’s model to a form of paraconsistent logic obliterates essential aspects of scientists' actual practice and reasoning.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Michael Cuffaro (2010). The Kantian Framework of Complementarity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (4):309-317.
Niels Bohr (1958/2010). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. New York, Wiley.
John Honner (1987). The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Quantum Physics. Oxford University Press.
Elias H. Alves (1984). Paraconsistent Logic and Model Theory. Studia Logica 43 (1-2):17 - 32.
Hans Radder (1982). An Immanent Criticism of Lakatos' Account of the 'Degenerating Phase' of Bohr's Atomic Theory. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 13 (1):99-109.
Helge Kragh (2001). The First Subatomic Explanations of the Periodic System. Foundations of Chemistry 3 (2):129-143.
Added to index2010-03-21
Total downloads3 ( #202,056 of 549,196 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?