Graduate studies at Western
Minds and Machines 3 (2):183-200 (1993)
|Abstract||At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in neurally-wired networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or trained into neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments are presented herein that humanssometimes follow rules which arevery rapidly assignedexplicit internal representations, and that humans possessgeneral mechanisms capable of interpreting and following such rules. In particular, arguments are presented that thespeed with which humans are able to follow rules ofnovel structure demonstrates the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms. It is further argued that the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms strongly indicates that explicit rule following is not anisolated phenomenon, but may well be a common and important aspect of cognition. The relationship of the foregoing conclusions to Smolensky''s view of explicit rule following is also explored. The arguments presented here are pragmatic in nature, and are contrasted with thekind of arguments developed by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their recent, influential paper|
|Keywords||Connectionism Machine Neural Representation Rule Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jacob Paroush (1997). Order Relations Among Efficient Decision Rules. Theory and Decision 43 (3):209-218.
Marcello Guarini (2001). A Defence of Connectionism Against the "Syntactic" Argument. Synthese 128 (3):287-317.
Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller (1992). Rules in Programming Languages and Networks. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kenneth Aizawa (1994). Representations Without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument. Synthese 101 (3):465-92.
Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1997). Pr Cis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.
Helmut Schnelle (1999). Rules or Neural Networks? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):1037-1038.
Robert F. Hadley (1995). The 'Explicit-Implicit' Distinction. Minds and Machines 5 (2):219-42.
William P. Bechtel (1988). Connectionism and Rules and Representation Systems: Are They Compatible? Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):5-16.
J. Hage (2000). Rule Consistency. Law and Philosophy 19 (3):369-390.
Robert F. Hadley (1990). Connectionism, Rule-Following, and Symbolic Manipulation. Proc AAAI 3 (2):183-200.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #90,611 of 740,025 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?