Explaining systematicity: A reply to Kenneth Aizawa [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 12 (4):571-79 (1997)
In his discussion of results which I (with Michael Hayward) recently reported in this journal, Kenneth Aizawa takes issue with two of our conclusions, which are: (a) that our connectionist model provides a basis for explaining systematicity within the realm of sentence comprehension, and subject to a limited range of syntax (b) that the model does not employ structure-sensitive processing, and that this is clearly true in the early stages of the network''s training. Ultimately, Aizawa rejects both (a) and (b) for reasons which I think are ill-founded. In what follows, I offer a defense of our position. In particular, I argue (1) that Aizawa adopts a standard of explanation that many accepted scientific explanations could not meet, and (2) that Aizawa misconstrues the relevant meaning of structure-sensitive process
|Keywords||Connectionism Explanation Science Structure System Aizawa, K|
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