McDowell, Transcendental Philosophy, and Naturalism

Philosophical Topics 37 (1):63-75 (2009)
First paragraph: I want to discuss the place of naturalism in the philosophy of John McDowell. There are some people who think McDowell is a naturalist in name only.1 But I think there is an aspect of his thinking which merits the title. And I think it is an aspect he could well do without, in light of his recent attempt to understand his own philosophy as a Hegelian radicalization of Kantian themes
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics200937116
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