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- Robert F. Hadley (1995). The 'Explicit-Implicit' Distinction. Minds and Machines 5 (2):219-42.Much of traditional AI exemplifies the explicit representation paradigm, and during the late 1980''s a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning explicit and implicit representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, based upon the criterion ofconstant time processing.The present paper examines Kirsh''s claims. It is argued that Kirsh fails to demonstrate that our usage of explicit and implicit is seriously confused or inconsistent. Furthermore, it is argued that Kirsh''s new formulation of the explicit-implicit distinction is excessively stringent, in that it banishes virtually all sentences of natural language from the realm of explicit representation. By contrast, the present paper proposes definitions for explicit and implicit which preserve most of our strong intuitions concerning straightforward uses of these terms. It is also argued that the distinction delineated here sustains the meaningfulness of the abovementioned debate between classicists and connectionists.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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This article proposes a unified framework for understanding creative problem solving, namely, the explicit–implicit interaction theory. This new theory of creative problem solving constitutes an attempt at providing a more unified explanation of relevant phenomena (in part by reinterpreting/integrating various fragmentary existing theories of incubation and insight). The explicit–implicit interaction theory relies mainly on 5 basic principles, namely, (a) the coexistence of and the difference between explicit and implicit knowledge, (b) the simultaneous involvement of implicit and explicit processes in most tasks, (c) the redundant representation of explicit and implicit knowledge, (d) the integration of the results of explicit and implicit processing, and (e) the iterative (and possibly bidirectional) processing. A computational implementation of the theory is developed based on the CLARION cognitive architecture and applied to the simulation of relevant human data. This work represents an initial step in the development of process-based theories of creativity encompassing incubation, insight, and various other related..
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| | Scholar | More options ... This commentary focuses on how Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) claims relate to aspects of development. First, I discuss recent research that supports D&P's claim that anticipatory looking in a false belief task is guided by implicit knowledge. Second, I argue that implicit knowledge may be based on exposure to regularities in the world as D&P argue, but equally, it may sometimes be based on theories that conflict with real world regularities. Third, I discuss Munakata et al.'s notion of graded representations as an alternative to the implicit-explicit distinction in explaining dissociations in infancy.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Dienes & Perner's target article contains numerous but unsystematic references to the implicit or explicit knowledge of the temporal context of a known state of affairs such as may constitute the content of a propositional attitude. In this commentary, the forms of cognition that, according to D&P, require only implicit knowledge of time are contrasted with those for which explicit temporal knowledge is needed. It is suggested that the explicit representation of time may have been important in human evolution and that certain developmental disorders including autism may be (partly) caused by defective ability to represent time.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: hdl.handle.net link.library.adelaide.edu.au | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: hdl.handle.net link.library.adelaide.edu.au | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Dienes & Perner propose a theory of implicit and explicit knowledge that is not entirely complete. It does not address many of the empirical issues, nor does it explain the difference between implicit and explicit learning. It does, however, provide a possible unified explanation, as opposed to the more binary theories like the systems and the processing theories of implicit and explicit memory. Furthermore, it is consistent with a theory in which implicit learning is viewed as based on the mechanisms of the cognitive architecture, and explicit learning as strategies that exploit these mechanisms.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The visual system captures a unique contrast between implicit and explicit representation where the same event (location of a visible object) is coded in both ways in parallel. A method of differentiating the two representations is described using an illusion that affects only the explicit representation. Consistent with predictions, implicit information is available only from targets presently visible, but, surprisingly, a two-alternative decision does not disturb the implicit representation.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Dienes and Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the HOT theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: arts.adelaide.edu.au | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: arts.adelaide.edu.au | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The scenario used by Dienes & Perner to show that individual representation can be implicit when property representation is explicit can be adapted to show that property representation can be implicit when individual representation is explicit. So there is no hierarchy of explicitness, contrary to their claim. There is a reading of the “implicit/explicit” distinction that does appear to exhibit an asymmetry parallel to that alleged to hold between individual and property. But this is not a distinction Dienes & Perner mention, nor is it one that could be easily incorporated into their framework.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... The degree to which information is encoded explicitly in a representation is related to the computational cost of recovering or using the information. Knowledge that is implicit in a system need not be represented at all, even implicitly, if the cost of recovering it is prohibitive.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge–knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words–and implicit knowledge–knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and cannot be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Robert F. Hadley, The 'explicit-implicit' distinction
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